Dynamic interactions between top-down expectations and conscious awareness
- aRadboud University Medical Center, Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, 6500 HB Nijmegen, the Netherlands
- bRadboud University, Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, 6500 HB Nijmegen, the Netherlands
- cUniversity of Amsterdam, Department of Psychology, 1001 NK Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- dUniversity of Amsterdam, Amsterdam Brain and Cognition (ABC), 1001 NK Amsterdam, the Netherlands
- Corresponding author: Simon van Gaal, University of Amsterdam, Department of Psychology, 1001 NK Amsterdam, the Netherlands, simonvangaal{at}gmail.com
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Author contributions: E.L.M., H.A.S., F.P.d.L., and S.v.G. designed research; E.L.M. performed research; E.L.M., H.A.S., F.P.d.L., and S.v.G. analyzed data; E.L.M., H.A.S., F.P.d.L., and S.v.G. wrote the paper.
Abstract
It is well known that top-down expectations affect perceptual processes. Yet, remarkably little is known about the relationship between expectations and conscious awareness. We address three crucial questions that are outstanding: 1) How do expectations affect the likelihood of conscious stimulus perception?; 2) Does the brain register violations of expectations nonconsciously?; and 3) Do expectations need to be conscious to influence perceptual decisions? We performed three experiments, in human participants, in which we manipulated stimulus predictability within the attentional blink paradigm, while combining visual psychophysics with electrophysiological recordings. We found that valid stimulus expectations increase the likelihood of conscious access of stimuli. Furthermore, our findings suggest a clear dissociation in the interaction between expectations and consciousness: conscious awareness seems crucial for the implementation of top-down expectations, but not for the generation of bottom-up stimulus-evoked prediction errors. These results constrain and update influential theories about the role of consciousness in the predictive brain.
SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT
While the relationship between expectations and conscious awareness plays a major role in many prediction-based theories of brain functioning, thus far few empirical studies have examined this relationship. Here, we address this gap in knowledge in a set of three experiments. Our results suggest that the effect of expectations on conscious awareness varies between different steps of the hierarchy of predictive processing. While the active use of top-down expectations for perceptual decisions requires conscious awareness, prediction errors can be triggered outside of conscious awareness. These results constrain and update influential theories about the role of consciousness in the predictive brain.
Footnotes
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The authors declare no competing financial interests.
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This work was supported by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO VENI (451-11-007) awarded to SvG; NWO VIDI (452-13-016) awarded to FdL), the European Research Council (ERC-2015-STG_679399 awarded to HAS) and the James S McDonnell Foundation (Understanding Human Cognition, 220020373, awarded to FdL). We thank Doris Dijksterhuis, Sjoerd Manger and Thomas Dolman for their valuable assistance with data acquisition. We thank Timo Stein and Josipa Alilovic for valuable comments on a previous draft of this manuscript.
- Received July 10, 2017.
- Revision received November 9, 2017.
- Accepted November 26, 2017.
- Copyright © 2018 the authors





